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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Problem area 
”The golden era” of piracy lasted from 1650 to 1730. Pirates were often viewed as 
ruthless savages with barbarian tendencies, sinking ships, killing crews and keeping 
all cargo with value. In this period, pirates were seen as a big threat to trade across the 
Atlantic (Rediker, 2004 pp 127-147). As a way of solving the problem the naval 
forces of the time, especially the English naval forces, apprehended pirates and 
conducted executions by hanging publicly. This was used as a scare tactic and as a 
warning to others. In 1734 piracy was considered defeated and extinguished mainly 
due to the fact that the big naval states had gotten involved in order to protect their 
commercial interests (Rediker, 2004 pp 127-147). “Who imagined that in 2009, the 
world's governments would be declaring a new War on Pirates?” (Hari, 2009). 
In the late 1990, piracy rose again after being considered almost eradicated and with 
this new rise in piracy, new counter piracy measures have also arisen. The so called 
modern piracy is a global problem, as acts of piracy have been reported in different 
areas of the world, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, the Strait of Malacca and 
other areas like the Gulf of Mexico. Modern maritime piracy is different to historical 
piracy in the terms of where they act and how they act. Shipping lanes where the body 
of water is small or enclosed like for example gulfs or straits are predominant targets 
(see appendix. 2). Modern piracy is practiced normally with small ships and small 
crews, unlike for example Barbary pirates in the 18th century (Clark, 1944). The 
modern pirates use advance technology like GPS to track targets and handheld 
transceivers to communicate with the different pirate vessels (NY daily news, 2008). 
We argue that modern day piracy is a problem to solve, because it causes a disruption 
in global economy by making the costs of shipping increase and destabilizes the 
region where piracy is committed. In particular, our research focuses on the Horn of 
Africa. 
The reason why this project on piracy focuses on the Horn of Africa is because it 
stands out compared to other regions with piracy on how they act. It stands out as the 
favorable topographic environment, and the international reaction whereas over 30 
countries have given their consent to participate in a war on piracy and have gotten 
involved to solve the problem. The Horn of Africa's coast, lines up to the Gulf of 
Aden and the red sea, which is the fastest route to go from Europe to Asia. Somalia 
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drew attention in 2008, because of an increase in piracy hijackings (see graph 1 
below). 
Piracy in Somalia started as a vigilant act by unsatisfied fishermen, whose living 
stock got taken by international fishermen that committed illegal fishing, which 
resulted in overfishing (Samatar et.al.2010).  Pirates began to enforce the law through 
vigilant acts, and then because of the reward from the first few successful hijackings, 
these men saw a business opportunity that would solve their economic troubles 
(Bueger, 2012). The hostages and vessels that the pirates took had different 
nationalities, so it had an impact on the international community and media (The 
Telegraph 2014; NY times 2012). To save the hostages and the vessels, countries or 
corporations had to either pay ransom or rescue them with force. Rerouting the ships 
would take more time and money, therefore corporations decided to continue to sail 
through high-risk waters. To summarize, our main reason for conducting research 
about maritime piracy in Somalia is the interesting dynamics that piracy, international 
organizations and the international community have. 
Graph 1 Statistics showing the changes in piracy on a yearly basis (IMO 2007-2013) remarking that the 
number is the annual total from that particular year. 
 
Research problem 
Worried about this increase in hijackings from 2007 to 2008 in the Horn of Africa. 
The international community started to allocate bigger emphasis in this phenomenon 
as ransom profits and the number of attacks rose. The first measure taken by the 
international community was to defend vessels going around the Horn of Africa from 
the threat of piracy. Resolution 1816 and 1838 (UN resolution 1816, 2008; UN 
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resolution 1838, 2008) of the UN Security Council gave the EU and NATO 
permission to combat piracy in that area. The intervention’s purpose was to prevent 
pirate attacks and to protect the commercial shipping vessels passing through the Gulf 
of Aden and the Indian Ocean.  
The Somali pirates proved to be a more complex problem than first expected.  Pirates 
were able to adapt to the newfound counter piracy measures and improved their 
tactics and equipment. This meant that they now were able to go further east into the 
high seas in their hunt for ships (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). As a result, by the 
beginning of the intervention, the total number of pirate attacks actually increased, as 
seen in graph 1, which shows that piracy off Somalia increased from 2007-2011. 
After the first setbacks, more actions were taken in order to fight pirates. Private 
companies took initiative to protect their own property and when the international 
community was able to prosecute those pirates captured, the international intervention 
achieved the result it was aiming for in 2011. During this period there were some ups 
and downs but the number of attacks topped in 2011. The following years until 2013, 
the problem was almost reduced to a bare minimum (see graph 1 above). This 
decrease is particularly interesting since no other region where piracy occurs has 
experienced this sudden decrease, even though measures have also been taken in other 
regions such as the gulf of Guinea and in the Strait of Malacca (Ben-Ari, 2013; Liss, 
2014) and the countries in those regions are also considered more stable and with 
more capacities to counter piracy than Somalia. This puzzle is also interesting, 
because the narrative of the pirates had not changed by 2011, and were still motivated 
to keep pirating and with no intention of stopping (Twyman-Ghoshal, 2013 pp 198). 
Therefore, the aim of this project is to explain the decrease of piracy from 2007 to 
2013. This decrease could possibly be explained by how the different counter piracy 
actions functioned in the relation to the downfall in numbers. Did the naval military 
intervention result in the decrease of piracy? Was it the shipping industry’s self 
defense measures? Was it the onshore measures for capacity building? Or was it a 
combination of military, industry and onshore solutions? To pursue these aims we 
have formulated this research question: 
  
“Which factors of countering piracy accounts for the 
decrease in piracy with roots in Somalia from 2007-2013?” 
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Chapter 2. Methodology 
 
For answering the research question methodological choices were made during the 
course of this project. Here, the choice of theory and empirical data will be explained. 
Reflections and implications on these choices are also located in this chapter. This 
project focuses on maritime piracy. Maritime piracy is in this case understood as an 
act by a determinate set of actors that captures, attacks or hijacks vessels. More 
precisely this project focuses on the action taken by the international actors in order to 
deter and stop maritime piracy. As a case of examination, the focus is on the 
international intervention in Somalia. 
Furthermore, to answer the research question, this project needed a project structure 
that could provide a comparison in time of the different actions taken by the 
international community. An overview of these actions for each time frame, and in the 
end correlate them with each other to know if one or a combination of multiple 
counter piracy efforts were the reason for the decrease of piracy in Somalia. 
Our point of departure is our theoretical approach, by looking at piracy through time 
in a particular setting, this project will be able to assess with more grounded evidence, 
the effect of different counter piracy measures. 
 
State of the Art 
In this section the aim is to explain the chain of thought in deciding about the 
approach to answer the research question, and to give an overview of piracy studies as 
a whole. 
Piracy studies rose from the need of a scientific explanation of piracy. In order to 
elaborate counter-piracy policy that would be efficient to lower piracy rates to a 
minimum. Since the 1990, studies have been done in order to understand this 
phenomenon. At first the attention was in the Strait of Malacca, where piracy rose. 
Then in 2007, the focus shifted dramatically to the Horn of Africa, where bigger ships 
were hijacked and ransoms were bigger. By 2011, the field has shifted again into 
West Africa, where Nigeria is experiencing the most attacks. Overall, although being 
a small field, more than 200 books and articles have been written in the field (Bueger, 
2014). 
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Piracy studies can be divided into three main directions of enquiry. The study of 
causes, practices and organization of piracy, the response to piracy, counter piracy 
policy, and also the attempt to contextualize modern piracy in the new world order 
(Bueger, 2014). 
The first pillar, as already mentioned, focuses on the phenomenon of piracy as a 
whole, identifying the root causes or factors that make piracy appear, the organization 
of piracy practice and how it is carried out (Hastings 2009; Samatar et.al. 2010). This 
knowledge is important for prevention and having an adequate response to piracy. 
Authors in this pillar have identified 8 main factors: geography, weak law 
enforcement, corruption of state officials, a certain degree of infrastructure to run 
piracy operations, population that accepts piracy and supports operations with 
logistics, skills and experience (navigation skills etc.), cultural acceptability of piracy 
as a legitimate action, poverty and lack of resources. (Bueger, 2012; Hastings, 2009). 
Although most of these studies have been done on a national level, some refinement 
have been done focusing in more local levels, introducing the cultural acceptability as 
a big factor in the “ideal mix” to produce piracy. Because of the necessity for some 
kind of infrastructure is crucial for piracy. Therefore, Hastings (2009), showed how 
piracy in the failed state is more simplistic, as it only seeks ransom. Where in other 
cases of piracy in a weak state, the pirates gain income by selling the boarded or 
hijacked vessels valuables on the black market. 
In this pillar, further research would have to focus on cultural investigations (Bueger, 
2014). This pillar will be used in our research to study the rise of piracy in Somalia 
before the intervention happened, as it is important to understand the situation as a 
whole in order to determine the efficiency of the different counter piracy efforts. 
The second pillar of piracy studies focuses on the counter piracy aspect, focusing 
mainly on the legal aspect. Geiss and Petrig (2011 cited in Bueger, 2014) have formed 
a discussion on how to deal with piracy from an international viewpoint, looking into 
United Nations Convention in the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and (SUA), 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of maritime navigation convention. 
Concluding that a sufficient legal regime exists, but that the problem is in the legal 
problems of implementation and coordination of laws. 
Kraska & Wilson (2011) take an evolutionary account of what has occurred in the 
different institutional responses to piracy, focusing in the different types of responses 
(corporate, strategic, legal and diplomatic), to the formation of the Maritime task 
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forces, and the allocation of piracy in the agenda of the UN Security Council or the 
Djibouti code of conduct process. 
Following the same evolutionary account as Kraska & Wilson, van Ginkel & 
Landman (2012), provides an overview of all the types of intervention occurring in 
Somalia to counter piracy at the moment. Highlighting how these interventions have 
changed over time. In this journal, only an overview is given, not an explanation of 
what factors accounted for the decrease in piracy since at the time of publication the 
decrease had not yet been observed. 
Developments on this pillar require more analysis in power relations and struggles 
with counter piracy policies and activities. It also requires an evaluation on how 
counter piracy, affects the wider security alignments and security relations in a global 
aspect (Bueger, 2014). This pillar will be useful in our project as it focuses mainly in 
counter piracy. This pillar give us the grounds to study how counter piracy measures 
came into effect, and what problems can be identified with them. 
The third pillar focuses in a more abstract definition of what piracy is, trying to 
contextualize by showing that piracy is not a new phenomenon, and explain the 
concept of piracy, arguing about the different paradigms and dilemmas in piracy and 
international responses (Bueger, 2014). In this pillar, the challenge is to continue the 
discussion of piracy in a long-term perspective and to interrelate these abstract 
discussions with the other two pillars. We will use this pillar to first decide what 
definition of piracy we use in our project and how to understand piracy in general. 
According to Twyman-Ghoshal (2014) studies concerning piracy have focused mostly 
in law and political relations, very few studies have been done in fields such as 
sociology and criminology. One exception is Worral (2000) who uses routine activity 
theory (RAT) to explain piracy in general terms, using data from Nigeria; Worral 
(2000) sheds some light on piracy by using the simple RAT theory, building in that 
discussion. This project will first use the simple RAT theory and then the Crime 
triangle to further the understanding of maritime piracy. In addition, this project with 
the information from the three pillars of piracy studies will try to fill that gap in 
knowledge by applying this theory in criminology and assess if this theory helps to 
shed light in a different understanding of counter piracy policies. 
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Definition of piracy  
A clear definition of piracy does not exist and for this project two different definitions 
of piracy were assembled together, in order to have a larger and clearer sample of 
piracy attacks. This decision was made in accordance to our source of statistics the 
IMO (International Maritime Organization), which reports on cases described by both 
definitions. The first definition, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states: 
"Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b)." 
(UNCLOS, 1982 article 101 pp 60-61) 
As noted by this definition, it is clearly stated that the illegal acts have to occur in the 
high seas, the high seas are the waters outside the territorial sea and internal sea of 
each state. These waters as defined by UNCLOS can extend up to two hundred miles 
of the nation’s coast (See appendix 2) (UNCLOS, 1982 article 56 p 44). 
Therefore by this definition, acts of violence inside a nations waters are not 
considered piracy. For this reason, in order to broaden our definition of piracy, we 
have taken the definition of “Armed Robbery against ships” as defined in the Code of 
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships: 
"Armed robbery against ships means any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat 
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed 
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a 
State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; 
(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.” 
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(IMO res. A.1025(26),2010a, annex, paragraph 2.2) 
So in this project, “Armed robbery against ships” will also be considered piracy. The 
reason behind this decision is that the first attacks in Somalia happened inside internal 
waters, and therefore by using only one definition, a sample of cases could have been 
lost. 
 
Use of empirical data 
We have divided our empirical material into 5 different groups: Organizations 
websites, newspaper articles, statistics reports, books and material provided by journal 
articles. By gaining knowledge from different sources with different points of view, 
we are able to paint a clearer picture of the case and avoid any misuse of information. 
As we are studying the international responses to piracy from different organizations 
and different means of intervention, it was logical for us to browse the different 
websites that each of the actors in play has created to inform about their activities in 
the area. It is very notable that this information is very useful for determining how 
each intervention was prepared, the objectives of the intervention, and even 
identifying some of the problems this intervention may have had. It is also important 
to state that since the authors of the website are also the ones conducting operations in 
the area, that their intentions in hiding errors or problems with their organizations 
could be a negative side of these websites. 
The statistical data for this project has been retrieved from the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) a branch of the United Nations (UN), which works in relation to 
maritime safety of shipping, and also trying to prevent pollution at sea by ships (IMO, 
2014). The IMO compiles monthly, quarterly, and annual reports on piracy in the 
world since the beginning of 1991. The main reason to choose this source was that it 
provided us with a detailed compilation of all piracy attacks from various sources (i.e. 
IMB, UKMTO, MSCHOA), making the data highly accessible and easy to collect. 
Another reason for using this source is that it reports pirate attacks and “armed 
robbery against ships”, giving the project a bigger sample for research. By only using 
one source for our statistical data, this project also aims to avoid overlapping errors of 
accounting for the same attacks more than one time. One of the main drawbacks about 
our statistical data is the fact that both underreporting and over reporting have 
happened. In this case, it is also important to say that now that the use of private 
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security guards is happening, they try not to report, as it would mean that the ship had 
to be in port during the later investigations of the authorities (van Ginkel & Landman, 
2012). In the case of over reporting, it is said that the statistical data from some of our 
sources are too broad, as it is the case of the IMO, which uses a broader definition of 
piracy causing that many reports of violence at sea being considered.  
News articles are used to give an account of events, on the case of Somali pirates. 
Since we mainly use news articles from western newspapers, we are aware of that the 
articles may be biased. With this in mind, newspapers still provide an account of 
events, which can be useful in relation with the other sources.  
Books are used to provide historical picture of the situation in Somalia. Books are 
also used in this project to understand theories and concepts that might be useful. 
Although books take time to publish, and therefore are not up-to-date, but offer useful 
information. 
The journals are used to give an in-depth understanding of the situation of piracy in 
Somalia. Journals in this project also provide data already analyzed and is used to 
ground the arguments on a solid basis, and the fact that journals have gone through 
peer-review process give us a ground of security in their reliability. 
When looking at our empirical material it is important to state that, it comes mostly 
from secondary sources. Apart from this, most of it, if not all of it come from Western 
Europe, this being an important distinction to make since our project focuses in an 
African country. Special care needs to be taken, while dealing with our statistical 
data, which comes from governmental sources or corporate associations. Therefore, 
some of these sources may have their own agendas and perceptions that they want to 
show. These problems have been addressed by comparing all different sources of 
information in a critical manner. 
 
Research design 
The counter piracy factors will be examined using a deductive approach, in the 
deductive approach the aim is to test already existing knowledge about a case, using 
hypothesis, and then used data to conclude, which hypothesis is the correct to explain 
that case (Bryman, 2008 pp, 24-25; Trochim, 2014). 
For the research design a Quasi experimental (Trochim, 2014) approach will be taken, 
since both pre and post statistics for the given periods is available. Instead of test 
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groups, the things that will be tested are how the rise in piracy was afflicted over a 
period of time. By doing so it allows the project to measure how the situation was 
without intervention.  
In order to determine the influence the different intervention styles (i.e. the 
deployment of naval forces in the area and private military security companies) had 
on the problem of maritime piracy with roots in Somalia. Different approaches will be 
taken in this project. First looking for scholarly journals and books arguing why 
maritime interventions of a sort will not be effective as precautionary elements. 
Secondly the “empirical statistics” in this project will be the number of pirate attacks; 
the main number is the number of attacks in total (Y). This number will furthermore, 
be divided into two subcategories, the incidents number (Yi), which is any ship that 
has had attempted boarding, actual boarding or actually being hijacked (to the pirates 
that could be considered the main form of success), and then the number of attempted 
attacks (Ya). The statistics is relevant to use within the different time periods. The 
time periods will be related to the intervention periods; these interventions will be 
referred to as X. Visualized it will look like this: 
 
 
       Design notation developed by the authors 
 
 Then for comparison we would be able to implement the intervention type, which in 
the first case would be the naval forces. Then look at the changes in the graph to see 
what happened (in this case it should preferably show a decrease in piracy activity, at 
least if the intervention were effective). 
 Then this would be done again, now with a new intervention type, with the increased 
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use of PMSC to counter piracy, and the use of protective measures suggested by the 
BMP4. At this period the naval forces are still present in the area so they should have 
some credit in the changes in the graph (the graph should again decrease if the piracy 
intervention worked), so this will in a sense be testing how the two (together) 
functioned as a guardian in relation to routine activity theory. 
The last factor that will be taken into consideration in this project is the measures of 
combating piracy taking place onshore. Those factors are difficult to asses using the 
statistics, since they do not function from the day of the insertion, and the start dates 
of these measures are relatively defined in particular, since there are several initiatives 
taken by various actors. The procedure for evaluating the onshore factors is by using 
the concepts of managers and handlers from the expanded crime triangle (see chapter 
3).The internal validity of this research design can be up for debate, since there are 
some factors that cannot be accounted for. In the first period no interventions were 
present. One thing worth mentioning is in fact counter terrorist missions were in 
process in that area, but since they did not focus on countering piracy and most likely 
did not have the capacity to influence piracy, we will disregard them as influencing 
the number of attacks. Another cause not taken into consideration is if the pirates all 
of a sudden decided to stop committing pirate attacks, which is most likely not the 
case, but it is still relevant to take into consideration. A factor arguing for this not 
being the case is interviews with pirates around 2011, were pirates are stating that 
their motivation has not changed (Twyman-Goshal, 2013 pp 198). The reason that 
this does not rule out this cause is, because it is only a few pirates who make this 
statement. 
Choice of theory 
Since there is no situational crime prevention theories in the context of maritime 
piracy, Worral (2000) have used the routine activity theory for explaining increases in 
piracy in general. Therefore, it could possibly be used for understanding how counter 
piracy strategies functions, and explain how piracy can be deterred in cases like 
Somalia. Since routine activity theory is a situational crime prevention theory, it 
should be able to explain the decrease in piracy, because it explains situational 
changes over time. The project is dealing with Maritime piracy that can be considered 
a predatory crime, due to the pirates nature of not stressing about harming others, in 
this case being the shipping personnel, for their own personal benefit, and get access 
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to the actual target (Felson & Santos, 2009 pp 32-33). The routine activity theory and 
the expanded crime triangle can be used for situational crime prevention, when 
dealing with a predatory crime on land basis. The authors would like to examine, if 
the theories can provide an insight and understanding of how the types of 
interventions functioned the way they did.   
Scholars such as Felson, Cohen and Santos have all contributed to the creation of the 
routine activity theory. For the understanding of the theory the main source of 
information will be the book by Tim Newburn (2013). The book is a collection of 
different theories and concepts within criminology with a chapter dedicated to 
situational crime prevention in general and a lot of focus on Rational choice and 
routine activity theory is being elaborated. For the understanding of the expanded 
crime triangle the book by Felson & Santos (2009) will be the main source of 
literature. 
The project will later test if the theory can be used as explanation to why some types 
of maritime intervention functions and why others fail to lower rates of piracy attacks.  
 
Operationalization 
To answer the research question the first step will be to examine and understand what 
types of different maritime based intervention strategy were used in the efforts of 
countering piracy. By understanding what efforts were taken, the analysis of why 
these could be viewed as adequate or not, and at the same time see if they, therefore 
work as a capable guardian in relation to the theory. The analysis will be based on 
several factors, beginning with seeing if the intervention strategy should have an 
impact on countering piracy or not. Then statistics regarding the number of attacks 
(Total number of attacks, incidents and attempts), will be examined using the 
calculation method explained in the project design. Implementing the two methods of 
“analysis” should provide justification in the assessment, if the intervention strategy 
can be viewed as a capable guardian or not.  Our research is divided in chapters, 
which focuses on different aspects of the situation in Somalia. The fourth chapter is 
examining the pirates and the situation in which they operate. The fifth chapter 
focuses on the deployment of naval forces in the afflicted area and the sixth chapter 
focuses on the acceptance of and compliance with corporate strategies and the use and 
problems using private security. The seventh chapter is focusing on land based 
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prevention factors most concretely in capacity building, whereas the other two are 
focusing on maritime prevention types.  
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Chapter 3. Theory 
 
Introduction 
The chosen theory in this project is routine activity theory; a middle range theory 
mostly derived from the grand theory of rational choice, this theory will be used in the 
context of Somalia. In order to understand routine activity theory it is important to 
understand aspects of rational choice. Arguable none of these theories are created for 
maritime piracy prevention, but by manipulating situations, they are used as land 
based crime-prevention theories. The two theories will be used to see if the concepts 
presented can be used to understand how temporary crime prevention works. The 
theory works with the concept of a capable guardian (Newburn, 2013), so the main 
part of it would be to examine if the measures taken by international organizations to 
protect the shipping routes going around the Horn of Africa, are sufficient to act as 
guardians. If it is found that the actors do not function as guardians, then the next 
assessment should be to check, if it is because the theory does not apply in the case of 
maritime piracy or if the counter piracy actions were not adequate. 
  
Rational choice theory 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is used to describe the way individuals base their 
decision-making. The RCT is based on the assumption that human beings make 
rational choices. These choices should be based on making the best choice available 
to suit ones own interest. Every choice a person makes should according to RCT be 
based on three factors 1) time, 2)  the accessible information and 3) the prestige the 
given decision is providing. From these three factors decisions should be based on the 
grounds of maximizing profits and lowering cost and or risks. Some would argue that 
the thought process occurring could be viewed as a cost benefit analysis. This allows 
for the problematic question of the motivation behind criminal acts, to be viewed as a 
calculation (Newburn, 2013 pp 287-290). According to RCT within criminology we 
are all capable of participating in criminal acts (Newburn, 2013 pp 287-290). Within 
RCT it would be if the profits outweighed the risks, to such degree that it would 
convince one that it was the rational option at disposal. 
In this case the link between maritime piracy and RCT would be that the pirates of 
Somalia had nothing to lose, meanwhile no legislations could prosecute the pirates, so 
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if they were to be caught they would possibly be released within a short period of 
time, this means that the risks were low but the payout high. According to RCT this 
would arguably be the reasoning for, why the Somali offenders chose this way of 
crime. This can most likely be related to the failed state of Somalia, since that is one 
of the major elements that should be present for piracy to exist (Samatar et.al., 2010).    
 
Routine activity theory 
Routine activity theory (RAT) can be viewed as a measure to prevent crime, and it 
shifts the general idea of criminology that studying the offender offers explanation for 
understanding and preventing crimes, RAT focuses on the aspect of the situation the 
given crime occurs in. The theory is providing the understanding that if the right 
situation presents itself every individual has the motivation to participate in a criminal 
act (Newburn, 2013 pp 291-297). 
In order to understand RAT we need the assumption from the RCT that every single 
individual is basing its decision on rational choices. Taking this into consideration, 
the RAT can be viewed as a predatory crime prevention and crime explaining theory. 
The concepts explained in RAT can temporarily prevent crimes from occurring. RAT 
is arguing that for a crime to occur three factors must be in place. A motivated 
offender willing to commit the crime, a suitable target and the absence of capable 
guardians. All three factors need to be present at the same time and place for a 
criminal act to occur. In the next segment these factors will be further examined 
(Cohen & Felson 1979; Newburn 2013 pp 291-297). 
Since routine activity theory derives from rational choice theory, the offender is 
considered a profit driven rational actor or a group of actors. Therefore, the 
motivation to commit the crime is often assumed (Hollis, Felson & Welsh, 2013). 
This offender then needs the capacity of committing a crime; this capacity is given by 
the situational aspects of the crime, and influences the ‘modus operandi’ of the 
offender. 
One of the elements that separate the routine activity theory from other theories in 
criminology is lack of attention on the offender. The focus is now on the grounds 
allowing crime to occur, and the time and space matter of how three elements must 
come together, or more precisely how two factors must be present and one must be 
absent. Felson (1998 pp 55-60) furthermore argues for four criteria that determines if 
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the target is right for the crime to occur. The target can both be an item or a person. 
Those criteria are called VIVA (Value, Inertia, Visibility, Access). 
From the perspective of the offender, value is what profit a target can provide. Inertia 
is the physical difficulty an item or person is presenting to the offender, for instance, 
is it realistic to remove or rob the target. Visibility measure if a target can easily be 
seen or if it’s hidden in any way. Access, does the access work in favor or against the 
offender, is the site where the target is located easily accessible or have measures 
been taken in order to make it difficult for offenders to access the site (Cohen & 
Felson 1979). All these factors can deter or motivate criminal acts simply by making 
it easier or more difficult to commit the respected crime. 
In routine activity theory, a guardian is considered, any person who may stop a crime 
from happening (Cohen & Felson, 1979). This concept implies therefore that security 
guards and police force may be capable guardians, but it should not undermine other 
capable guardians, such as the presence of other people or even the owner of a 
property (Felson & Santos, 2009 pp 25-33). It is also important to understand that in 
relation to the crime, the importance is the absence of a capable guardian, since it is 
what makes the offender have no deterrence. (Ibid pp 25-33.) 
Since the creation of Routine activity theory, this theory has been updated, revised 
and tested many times; one of these revisions is the crime triangle. The crime triangle 
leads to a more detailed explanation of the dynamics of the different concepts. 
  
The crime triangle 
The crime triangle is according to Felson & Santos (2009 pp 25-33) of universal 
usage for explaining and preventing crime. The argument being that the triangle is an 
effective way of assessing what prevention methods can be used for preventing a 
given crime. 
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   Source: Crime and Everyday Life (2009 pp 29-33) Felson M. & Santos R. 
 
The inner triangle consists of the three main objects for a criminal act to occur the 
target, the offender and the place must all come together in time for the occurrence of 
a crime. Furthermore the outer triangle is the factors that can prevent the crime from 
happening. The handler would be seen as any actor who can prevent the offender’s 
motivation for a given crime, being by decreasing the opportunity for the offender to 
act, or by having a moral tie to the offender. The manager is the place manager it 
might be an attendant watching over a parking lot or the night watchmen at the park. 
The guardian could be anybody from a security guard, friend of the target or a police 
officer, the most important is that they are present at the right place at the right time. 
So for a crime to occur the offender must lose his handler, see that there is a place 
with a lack of manager and there is a target with no guardian, and all of these 
conditions must be present at the same time (Felson & Santos 2009 25-33). 
The routine activity theory will in the case of maritime piracy, be used to assess 
whether or not the theory can provide an insight in the understanding of what could 
function as a guardian, along with using other concepts from the theory for instance 
the VIVA will be used to understand the measures, the ships took in order to prevent 
ships from being hijacked i.e. water canons, barbed wire and high speed maneuvers. 
The crime triangle will be used for explanation of the impact the onshore preventive 
factors had, and how these helped lower the number of pirate attacks. 
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Application to Case of piracy in Somalia 
The VIVA will mostly be used in the precautionary matters suggested in the BMPs. 
The concepts presented by the expanded crime triangle will be examined in two parts, 
first crime prevention by installment of the capable guardian as a temporary solution, 
then the concepts of manager and handler will be examined in the matters taken 
onshore and could possibly present a more permanent solution. The rational choice 
perspective will also be used in the factors of counter piracy onshore. 
 
 
    Crime triangle modified by the Authors 
 
The expanded crime triangle has been edited to suit the case of countering Somalia 
based pirates. The crime is the criminal act of piracy and the place is the Somali 
waters, which are the ports and national waters of Somalia. The target is the 
commercial shipping vessels sailing around the Horn of Africa and the offenders are 
the Somali pirates, who act the crime on commercial shipping vessels. This is the 
crime triangle. The expanded crime triangle gives an addition of other factors to 
understand maritime piracy. The capable guardian will be a combination of PMSC 
and Naval forces. The guardian’s task is to deter piracy. The handlers are the clan 
elders and the Somali population that works as a moral support to stop pirates from 
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illegal acts. The manager is the government of Somalia, but the executive branch 
enforcing the law. 
 
Limitations of the theory 
Like any other theory the rational choice theory has got some criticism from 
academics. A critique for rational choice theory is that the theory focuses on the 
individual agents and not the structure behind it. The focus is pointed at what the 
individual person would do in the given situation, and not what drove the individual 
to the situation. 
A critique for the routine activity theory is, how efficient it is to prevent crime. The 
methods used to reduce crime do not change the criminal behavior. It only prevents 
the crime in a given situation. The criminal can just do other unlawful acts somewhere 
else or sometimes else. The theory is a crime preventing theory, but not apprehending, 
because it does not give any optional measures for rehabilitation. (Miró, 2014) With 
the critiques and limitations in mind, we still believe that routine activity theory 
provides a suitable answer to our project, since it gives us a general answer to a 
complex problem of the situation. While the motivations behind the different pirates, 
would be hard to study because of the lack of information on an individual level. 
With these limitations in mind an argument would be that the routine activity theory 
is only being used to understand temporary matters taken to counter piracy, so despite 
the limitations the theory should still be relevant for the focus of this project.  
  
Chapter conclusion 
The routine activity theory has been proved efficient in the ideas of altering and 
manipulating situations to make them less appealing to the offender. The theory and 
its sub theories (i.e. Expanded crime triangle and VIVA) all provides ideas of what 
concepts should be understood and implemented in order for lowering crime rates on 
land based crimes. Even though the particular theory is not designed for maritime-
based predatory crime prevention, the theory has proved functional to prevent land 
based predatory crimes. The authors seek to investigate if the theory can be applied to 
the case of modern maritime piracy with roots in Somalia. If the theory is suitable for 
this case, it possibly could be applied in order to understand what factors play a role 
in maritime crime prevention. 
	   23	  
Chapter 4. Somalia’s Situation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will be focusing on the period before the counter piracy measures in the 
Gulf of Aden, even though there were some operations of counter terrorism in the 
area, these actions did not focus on countering piracy in particular.  
Additionally the root causes and the motivation for the pirates will be examined. 
Explaining the context in which piracy in Somalia rose, the impact it had on 
international trading, and the global community in general. Furthermore a description 
of how the pirates operate, and what obstacles they brought for international trading. 
Clarifying the situation of piracy in Somalia from the time period of 2007 to 
December 2008, the reasoning for choosing this period is that piracy attacks rose 
(IMO, 2007 & IMO, 2008), and December 2008 is the period for the first counter-
piracy intervention. 
 
The root causes of Somali piracy 
The threat of maritime piracy is causing additional risks to commercial shipping 
routes going around the horn of Africa. The shipping route between Asia and Europe 
is an important trading route for the world economy, as 20 percent of commercial 
ships navigate those waters every year (MSCHOA, 2014). With all this taken into 
account the international community is now facing piracy with a favorable 
geographical location, technical equipment and capabilities that create a threat before 
entering those dangerous waters. 
The reasons for piracy to prosper are by Samatar et.al. (2010), these four criteria, 
which are the root causes for piracy. Academics say that these four criteria need to be 
fulfilled for piracy to exist in a region. 
“1) The existence of a favorable topographic environment; 
2) The prevalence of ungoverned spaces—either as the result of legal dispute 
between states or simply because of their absence; 
3) The existence of weak law enforcement or weak political will of 
governments or a cultural environment that is not hostile to piracy; and 
           4) The availability of great rewards for piracy while the risks is minimal”  
( Murphy 2010, cited in Samatar, et.al. 2010, p 1378 ) 
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The uprising of piracy could be seen as an outcome of the failed state of Somalia and 
the illegal trawlers disregarding what should belong to Somalia. The failed state of 
Somalia cannot afford to have a coast guard protecting national waters. This caused 
international fishing vessels to come and overfish the waters of Somalia, and others 
intentionally dumped nuclear waste for cheap disposal (UNEP, 2005 pp 45-48). 
Although technically the overfishing was not illegal since the government of Somalia 
did not have declared the area as a Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (OCB, 2014a). 
This practice took away the main means of food and generated income for the 
fishermen of Somalia (Sumaila & Bawumia 2014). So according to the pirates the 
reason for their actions is that they are the unofficial coast guards of Somalia, and the 
ransoms they collect are seen as a reimbursement for stealing all the fish and for the 
exploitation of the Somali waters. A proof of that narrative of piracy is the name the 
pirates gave themselves such as the ‘Kismayo Volunteer Coastguards’ or the 
‘National volunteer coastguard’ (Bueger, 2013). 
Somalia is part of the Horn of Africa, and is near a popular shipping route (see 
appendix. 2), and their waters are a lucrative place to fish, since the waters are rich in 
fish, it attracts a lot of attention from the international community (Samatar et. al., 
2010). It gives the pirates easy targets with all the traffic of commercial shipping 
vessels and trawlers. Hijackings are also advantageous for them near the narrow Gulf 
of Aden. They used this approach until the narrow route was patrolled and a creation 
of a secure route, the IRTC was installed (Rengelink, 2012; Kumar, 2014). 
There was a civil war going on in Somalia in 1988. In 1991 the Siad Barre communist 
regime fell, and there were no longer any government in Somalia (Hesse, 2011 p1). 
Since the fall, unrest and conflict have been upon the country, with no government 
being strong enough to bring stability to the area, making Somalia officially 
recognized as a failed state (Failed state index, 2014). The first actions of piracy were 
seen around this period in Somalia’s stateless situation. Somalia has since then been a 
clan driven country divided into different clans and obeyed under a warlord system 
(Hesse, 2011 p 3). The lack of a strong government in Somalia affects other causes 
for piracy to prosper. There is weak law enforcement and a weak political will. This 
gave the pirates freedom to commit piracy. The lack of an executive branch to uphold 
the law also resulted in fishing companies in the area overfishing the area, and 
therefore took the livelihood of the locals. This caused some of the fishermen to 
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create their own coast guard to take matters into their own hands and became 
vigilantes (Samatar et.al. 2010). 
The freedom the pirates had, because of the weak infrastructure in Somalia, decreased 
the risks of getting caught and prosecuted.  
The hostage taking is a difficult issue for western societies, because of the idea “not to 
negotiate with terrorists”, by allowing the pirates to get a ransom, it could possibly 
encourage more pirates to try and do the same, which would increase pirate attacks. In 
2008 an estimated 150 million dollars were paid in ransom to Somali pirates (Fu, Ng 
& Lau, 2010). The small risk of getting caught and the revenue as a reward made 
piracy look attractive.   
All these factors made the IMO and the World food program WFP (which ships were 
getting attacked, impeding the distribution of food to the Somali population in need) 
callout for help in countering piracy (WFP, 2007). Pirates of Somalia operate by 
kidnapping the crew of the ship they hijack for later demands and receive ransoms for 
the hostages (The telegraph. 2014). The pirates do not tend to harm hostages, but it 
happens occasionally. The only element the Somali pirates are after is money, which 
creates a long drawn process that often takes months before the cash amount is agreed 
upon (TIME, 2009). The motivation for pirates in Somalia is that they see the vessels 
as obligated to pay a tax to go through their waters; this is also the pirate’s own 
justification, of why they do it (Bueger, 2013). 
 
How was the threat of piracy on an international level 
Before the international interventions the pirates were more or less allowed to operate 
how they liked. If the pirates ever came in trouble, all they had to do was to reach the 
Somali coast, as the international organizations would not interfere in Somalia, 
because they had to respect Somalia’s sovereignty, and because past interventions in 
Somalia had led to more problems than solutions (Samatar, 2011 pp 66-67). At this 
time there was no international intervention, this meant that the response time was too 
long, and therefore the odds of stopping the pirates before they reached the shore was 
minimal. These factors made it clear that preventive actions needed to be taken. On 
the international level the issue of piracy presented a big threat, because of additional 
costs were added to maritime shipping in the Gulf of Aden. The cost of piracy is 
reported to be between 7 billion and 12 billion dollars in 2010 (when the first reports 
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started appearing) (Bowden & Basnet, 2012). Although the costs of piracy are not 
only based on the ransoms paid to the pirates. The majority of the money is in the 
raises of insurance premiums, because of the high-risk area in the Gulf of Aden and 
other costs, such as the increased costs of oil because of the increased speed that 
vessels navigate on in those waters. The shipping industry decided to assume these 
costs, because if ships had to take an alternate route, avoiding the high-risk areas at 
the Horn of Africa, this meant an increase in time and oil. Although the costs of 
piracy are not that significant for a trillion dollar industry, the decision of navigating 
those waters puts the lives of crewmembers and ships at risk, since they travel with 
few crewmembers and no security personnel.  
 
Analysis 
It is possible to state that the number of attacks in each time period clearly shows an 
increase in piracy in 2007. The total number of piracy attacks reported was 60, the 
number of attacks that resulted in an incident is 27, and 33 is the number of attacks 
considered as failed (IMO, 2007). In 2008, the number of attacks rose to 134, 
resulting in 61 incidents and 73 failed attempts (IMO, 2008).  
 
 
 
That shows that piracy rose in this period. 
As Worral (2000) have applied the routine activity theory to the general case of 
maritime piracy, using data collected from primarily Nigeria. Using the routine 
activity theory in the case of maritime piracy in Somalia, it is clearly shown in the 
chapter that the conditions for a crime to occur according to routine activity theory are 
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present in Somalia. A motivated offender, in this case would be the Somali coastal 
population, to which poverty and the abuse by the illegal fishermen took away their 
only mean of livelihood, the maritime resources, which drove them into piracy. This 
did not only provide money, but would also be a practice, on which expertise at sea 
(as fishermen have), would be of use, making the choice of turning into piracy instead 
of other illegal practices on land more preferable. The great abundance of ships, 
sailing through the Gulf of Aden, with unarmed crewmembers, made the ships a 
suitable target, which had no choice but to travel through those waters. Finally, the 
failed state of Somalia and its waters, where there is little governance, no coastguard 
and very little law enforcement on land, provided a location where no capable 
guardian was able to prevent the crime from happening.  
  
Chapter conclusion 
Since the means of livelihood was taken from the former fishermen of Somalia. They 
were left with equipment that enables them to commit acts of piracy. So they formed 
the “unofficial coast guard of Somalia” hijacking vessels passing through the area. 
Demanding for the vessels to be released for a ransom or what the pirates call a “tax” 
should be paid to reimburse their loss. The pirates started to realize that from a 
rational choice perspective, this was a profitable practice since there was no 
functioning government to keep them for conducting piracy activities. There was a 
low risk of getting caught meanwhile the benefits, which in this case is money were 
high. The routine activity helps understand that three elements required for a crime to 
occur came together in time and space (Offender, absence of capable guardian and a 
suitable target). 
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Chapter 5. Naval Forces  
 
Introduction 
In this section, what the maritime military intervention does to counter piracy will be 
explored. As being the first reaction to counter piracy, expectations were high in the 
international community as to the militaries deterring of piracy, but that was not the 
case. For this reason, this chapter will first explain the different military naval forces: 
Operation Ocean Shield (mandated by NATO), Maritime Task Force 151, EU 
NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and the different individual nation’s enterprises. 
Then we will identify the problems that was presented with counter piracy, which 
leads to the evaluation on why the naval forces didn’t work as a capable guardian, 
since piracy increased during the period even though the naval forces showed some 
effect, they did not show the expected effect. 
  
Establishment of counter piracy operations in Somalia 
Although some naval armies in command of the combined maritime forces (CMF) 
were already established in the area since 2001, their main concern was on counter 
terrorism and not on countering piracy (CMF, 2014). At first, single state’s navies 
reacted to this threat by protecting WFP (World Food Program) vessels, these 
countries were France, Denmark and Canada (WFP, 2007). UNSC resolutions 1816 & 
1838 gave the international organizations such as NATO and EU a ground for 
intervention, and gave them access to Somali waters and called on those navies to 
prosecute piracy (UN resolution 1816 & 1838, 2008). The first operation after the 
Security Council‘s resolution was Operation Allied Provider, led by NATO. This 
operation was created to give escort to WFP vessels, while operation ATALANTA 
from the EU was being prepared; this mission only lasted until late 2008 (NATO, 
2008). In March 2009, a new operation Allied Protector started. The main goal of this 
mission was to improve safety in the Horn of Africa’s waters and give escort to 
vessels in need (NATO, 2009). In August 2009, Operation Ocean Shield then 
replaced Allied Protector. The focus of this mission was the same as Allied Protector, 
but added to their focus was also the training of local coastguards. (NATO, 2014). At 
the same time that NATO operations were happening, the EU, more precisely EU 
naval forces (EUNAVFOR) created its own operation, operation ATALANTA, the 
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first EU maritime operation. The operation was tasked with the protection of the WFP 
and AMISOM ships or any ship of importance, contributing to control fishing 
activities in the Somali waters and the prevention of piracy and armed robbery from 
the Somali coast (EUNAVFOR, 2014). One difference between these two 
interventions was that ATALANTA was allowed to send armed guards into ships and 
prosecute pirates, but their field of operation was narrowed to 500 nautical miles of 
the coast of Somalia. After two extensions of ATALANTA were made, ATALANTA 
could now also enter national and internal waters of Somalia (van Ginkel & Landman, 
2012). This change allowed the ATALANTA operation to have a more offensive 
nature, pursuing pirates into national waters and even attacking with air strikes in the 
so called piracy ‘hot-spots’ (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). The third main counter 
piracy force is the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) of the combined maritime 
forces (CMF). The CMF is led by the US and is a cooperation of 30 nations, its 
organization and integration is more flexible and free than NATO and EU. This task 
force does not focus on the prosecution of pirates, but provides one fifth of the ships 
in the area, contributing to patrolling the area (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). Other 
states launched their individual counter piracy operations, because of a decline to join 
CMF due to political and national interests. These nations mostly escort ships sailing 
under its flag; some examples can be China or Russia (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). 
By 2010, 30 to 40 naval forces were patrolling 2,000,000 nmi2 (Apps, 2010). This 
number has changed due to policies taken by the different nations in order to lessen 
their expenses, because they cannot afford costly naval operations, which then 
increases the scope of the problems that will be discussed below (van Ginkel & 
Landman, 2012). 
 
Internationally recommended transit corridor (IRTC) 
Another way to protect commercial shipping vessels from piracy was the creation of a 
patrolled and protected shipping route. It was first established by the CMF and 
Combined Task Force 151 as the maritime security patrol area (MSPA) in 2008 
before the naval intervention happened (NAVYa, 2008; NAVYb, 2008) and later 
renamed IRTC by MSCHOA who now manages the corridor (van Ginkel & 
Landman, 2012). The IRTC was one of the main solutions to counter piracy, by 
securing the corridor, naval forces created an area where commercial vessels could 
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travel in caravan and be protected from attacks. The corridor is 492 nm in the Gulf of 
Aden, consisting of two sea-lanes that run next to each other, under protection of the 
EUNAVFOR, NATO and the CTF-151 (Rengelink, 2012; Kumar, 2014). This 
corridor is the main strategy of deterrence that naval forces can effectively give. 
 
Problems with Naval Intervention 
Even though the maritime intervention did have some positive influence, since it 
successfully prevented some attacks from happening. Piracy kept increasing, 
demonstrating the insufficiency of the intervention. First of all, the size of the area to 
protect was too big, meaning that depending on where the attack took place, naval 
forces could take days to arrive at the scene of the attack (van Ginkel & Landman, 
2012). This also meant that even if naval forces arrived, pirates may already have 
taken the crew members hostage, making the risk of taking the pirates down by force 
too high. It is therefore that the strategies of the naval forces had to change and now 
they actively pursue pirates before the attack happens (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). 
Secondly, another problem naval forces needed to overcome is organization and 
communication. All the different interventions have different hierarchies, closed 
communication systems, capacities and interests (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). 
Most of these problems were solved relatively efficiently with the creation of the 
contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which will be explained in 
chapter 7. To further their cooperation the SHADE meetings were created. It was a 
meeting that brought together the different actors at play every three months to 
discuss tactical developments in the fight against piracy (van Ginkel & Landman, 
2012). 
A problem mostly the operation ATALANTA and the first operations of interventions 
had, were how the Somali pirates had adapted to the situation and developed a new 
“modus operandi” (how they operate). They got better equipment, so that they could 
go further into international waters for their hunt, where the operations did not have 
jurisdiction or patrolled. Finally, one of the main problems faced by the intervention 
were the legal problems involved in the nature of a transnational crime such as piracy. 
In the UN resolution it is clearly stated that the only procedure established to 
prosecute pirates is that the naval forces that captures the pirate can by their own will, 
decide to prosecute the pirate or not. Since the will of those states was nil in that 
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regard (Rengelink, 2012), Combined Task force 151 and NATO had to release 
pirates, in a practice called “catch and release”, due to their lack of guidance in what 
to do when pirates were captured. On the other hand ATALANTA did have guidance 
in prosecuting pirates giving it a better course of action that could discourage piracy 
(EU NAVFOR, 2014). At first they were troubled, since they could not prosecute the 
pirates they caught, because they were missing the legal framework to send pirates to 
jail. Cooperation between the organizations and an agreement called the Djibouti code 
of conduct made it possible to prosecute the pirates. This agreement gave the nations 
that signed it the right to prosecute pirates, where before the nation had to have 
national connection with either the pirates or the attacked ship (van Ginkel & 
Landman, 2012).  
 
Analysis 
Since operation Allied Protector and operation ATALANTA was established in 2008 
to counter piracy, there have been some changes. The total number of reports of 
piracy acts in 2008 was 134. Of those 134, 73 of them were failed attempts and 61 
were actual incidents. In 2009 the number of attempts was 163 and the number of 
incidents was 59, which add up to a total of 222 reports regarding piracy (IMO, 
2009). Compared to 2010 where the number of attempts was 124 and the number of 
incidents 48 that is a total of 172 reports (IMO, 2010b). So the number of attempts 
and incidents show a decrease from 2009 to 2010. The change in maritime piracy 
according to these numbers shows an increase from 2008 to 2009. From those 
numbers we can explain that piracy increased from 2008 to 2009 and then showed a 
decrease from 2009 to 2010.  
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The threat of piracy has not been contained, because of the problems the navies had 
with the area to patrol, lack of communication and cooperation, and lastly the problem 
regarding the legal issues to prosecute the pirates ruined the international 
community’s efforts to increase the risk of piracy. The area was too big to patrol by 
the naval forces, and they were restricted to a certain area. The pirates that they 
caught could not be prosecuted properly, because of a lack of legislations, which 
resulted in a “catch and release”. These two factors kept the risks of getting caught 
low, and since the revenue from ransoms were high, piracy was still beneficial 
compared to the risks. When looking at the map from 2009: 
 
   
  Map of reported piracy attacks in 2009 source: (IMB, 2010) 
 
It shows that the majority of the pirate attacks were concentrated around the IRTC, 
where the naval forces had their focus, which could be used to explain the “success” 
the naval forces experienced in this period, since the number of attacks decreased. 
The map from 2011 
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     Map of reported piracy attacks in 2011 source: (IMB, 2012) 
 
Shows that the area pirates attack have moved further away from the IRTC and 
moved further into the ocean making the area the naval forces had to protect increase 
in size. That could be the reason for the decrease and later the increase. In the year 
2011 even though the pirates had adopted to the new measures of the naval forces and 
expanded the area, in which they operate, the naval forces were not without effect. In 
the period there were fewer hijackings than the previous year, which meant that they 
had an effect in preventing hijackings but not deterring pirates from even attempting 
to commit the attacks, as they should in order to function as a capable guardian.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
When we look at the numbers in 2009 and 2010, we can clearly see a change in the 
number of attempts and attacks. There has been a decrease in number of attempts and 
incidents, but the total number of piracy reports is still very high and the decrease is 
not nearly enough, for what it was expected it to be. The naval forces influences were 
minimal, since they did not detain the threat. If they had a bigger impact than what the 
number shows, it could be because their more offensive tactics could stop and 
apprehend some pirates, and the patrolled IRTC was used to protect commercial ships 
from pirates, then the naval forces would have some influence. But there were still 
problems for them to overcome in order to be a capable guardian. Even after the naval 
forces were installed as a guardian, the pirates were still motivated to commit crime. 
	   34	  
The conclusion is that the naval forces of the international community’s operations 
alone did not work as a capable guardian, since they did not deter pirates from even 
attempting attacks.  
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Chapter 6.  Corporate responses to piracy 
 
Introduction 
Since the naval forces that were sent to deal with the pirates, did not have the intended 
impact on the situation in Somalia, because of the continuation of the threat from 
piracy and the costs for the shipping industry. The shipping sector decided to take  
measures to protect their cargo and crew. 
In order to protect themselves more efficiently, a coalition of the shipping industry’s 
organizations, the representatives of the naval interventions and the international 
community created a set of guidelines for ships to take. The document, called “Best 
Management Practices for protection against Somalia based Piracy”(BMP), it was 
first introduced in 2009, but the shipping companies took time to introduce it, because 
of the investment it implied. Slowly the majority of vessels now follow the BMP (van 
Ginkel & Landman, 2012).  Although many practices are introduced in the BMP, the 
most problematic is the acceptance of the use of the PMSC. 
As with the naval forces, a problem with law and regulations exist, in this case, the 
problem is also jurisdiction and sovereignty. Due to the international nature of 
shipping, the PMSC are faced with many legal overlaps. In this chapter, we will 
explain the BMP strategy in accordance with counter piracy, and the rise of PMSC in 
the shipping industry, as well as the services they provide and the problems this type 
of security practices may have. Afterwards, an evaluation of the BMP and the PMSC 
in regards to our theory will be done.   
  
Best Management Practices for protection against Somalia based 
piracy 
The BMP4 is made by all the actors congregated in the area. It offers guidance on 
how to protect the vessel, in order to make piracy less successful. The first of this 
measure is watch keeping and vigilance, therefore the BMP4 (2011) recommends that 
before entering the high-risk area, more crew members should be assigned to do 
watch keeping with less hours in rotation, so people are more aware of what their job 
is. Then they have to make sure that all the materials needed are there (i.e. binoculars) 
and following the radar for any suspicious activity. Also, while navigating the high-
risk area, only navigation lights should be used to avoid the overexposing of the ship. 
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If an approach is detected, it is important to start the security practice immediately, 
increasing the speed of the ship and doing maneuvers, so that the waves made by the 
ship are disrupting the maneuvering of the attackers’ ship. By using a particular sound 
alarm for a piracy attack, so that there is no confusion is suggested, so the crew is 
aware that an attack is happening. The pirates are also aware that the crewmembers 
know, they are under attack and will proceed to respond to it (BMP4, 2011). 
In order to secure that the boarding does not happen, a number of measures need to be 
taken following the BMP4’s (2011) guidelines. The pirates use ladders and hooks to 
board the ship from the lowest point of the ship. In these cases it is important to place 
physical barriers, by increasing the height and difficulty of the climb for the pirate. 
Barbed wire, creates an effective measure when well placed. The type of barbed wire 
most used in the case of ships is ‘Concertina’. Concertina is constructed with high 
tensile wire, and makes it difficult for a obstacle to surpass. The recommended use of 
barbed wire is in short sections of ten meters in the most vulnerable places of the ship 
(BMP4, 2011). Besides barbed wire, water cannons and foam are used to make the 
climb more difficult. This is suggested in the BMP4 (2011). One of the reasons to use 
water cannons is that it becomes more difficult for the pirates to actually board the 
ship. Foam can also be used, as a good way of disrupting the climb. It is noticeable to 
say that these suggestions state that all machines should be automatic and well placed, 
without putting any crewmembers at risk, which may have to control these machines. 
If a ship is to be boarded, the suggestion made in the BMP4 is to have further 
protection on the bridge of a vessel, since pirates will likely fire their weapons at the 
bridge in order to make the ship stop. Once boarded, they take control of the bridge, 
which is what allows the pirates to take control of the ship. Some of the protection 
measures for the bridge are reinforced windows or even metal plates outside the 
windows, so even if the window breaks there is still protection from the pirates. It is 
also important to secure the “wings of the bridge” by a suggested wall of sandbags 
(BMP4, 2011). In order to secure the bridge fully, access to the bridge needs to be 
restrained and controlled to delay the pirates. Doors that give access to the bridge 
should be secured, and an escape route should be planned if the crewmembers need to 
abandon the bridge. When sailing through the high-risk area, doors should be secured. 
Other points of importance such as external ladders, machine rooms and storerooms, 
should also be prepared by the crewmembers, so that only controlled access is 
allowed. It is also important in case of boarding, that the ships use CCTV cameras in 
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the ship, so that the captain is able to know the location of the pirates at all time. In 
this case CCTV cameras are also useful in order to collect evidence after the incident 
has finished (BMP4, 2011). In case that the bridge is compromised, the use of a safe 
point or a citadel is also recommended. The safe point or citadel should be located in 
the position where the most physical protection to the crew can be given. In case of a 
boarding the crewmembers that knows how to defend the ship, should do that, while 
the others should go to the citadel, after that the trained crewmembers should go to 
that position if the bridge is compromised. Before that they should try to sabotage the 
propulsion of the boat, so that the pirates cannot move it to a safe position. It is also 
suggested that the ship’s safe point or citadel had external access to communications 
from that of the bridge, so that in case of a sabotage of communications, security 
forces could still communicate with the safe point/citadel. (BMP4, 2011). The use of 
these suggestions by the vessels navigating through the high-risk area should by itself 
avoid the hijacking of the vessels. Reports indicate that the acceptability and use of 
the BMP has increased in 2010 to 2011 from 32% to  57% (van Ginkel & Landman, 
2012).Although other measures in order to protect the vessels, such as the use of 
private security guards on board vessels, have also been used. 
 
Installment of PMSC 
Even with the presence of naval forces and other BMP security measures being 
pursued, the number of attacks rose in 2009 and 2010. 
This led the shipping industry to change its position in regards to private security 
firms. The main evidence of this shift of perception can be seen in the statement by 
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), which is formed by 80 percent of the 
international shipping community. Until that moment, the ICS had not supported the 
use of PMSC. However, after a meeting in London on February 15th 2011 the ICS 
stated: 
“The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has changed its policy on 
private armed guards, and now accepts that operators must be able to defend 
their ships against rising pirate attacks.” (Reuters, 2011) 
Another piece of evidence of the change in perceptions on the use of PMSC is the 
fourth edition of the (BMP4). This paper is a set of rules and steps that ship owners 
and crewmembers have to follow while navigating through the high-risk area or in 
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case of a piracy attack. In contrast, to the ICS’ statement, the BMP4 change is 
especially important, since it is written and edited with the participation of not only 
the international shipping organizations, but also with the assistance of the 
international community, therefore when the BMP4 added a new section regarding 
the use of PMSC in which it says: 
“The use, or not, of armed private maritime security contractors on-board 
merchant vessels is a matter for individual ship operators to decide…” 
(BMP4, 2011 p. 39) 
This addition meant that many ship owners now perceived the use of PMSC as an 
acceptable practice, which then was their decision to use, but that all the actors 
involved in the situation accepted. Even though the actual percentage of ships that use 
PMSC is unclear, due to the lack of transparency from shipping companies in order to 
avoid legal issues (Spearin, 2012). It is clear that its use has increased over time, some 
estimates that by 2013 PMSC were used in more than 60 percent of the vessels 
navigating the waters of the high-risk area (The Economist, 2013). 
PMSC offer four main services or strategies to handle piracy. Although some of those 
practices are harmless and one could even argue positive, others provides room for 
debate. The four categories recognized by Struwe (2012) are: 
“1.     Security intelligence, risk assessment and consulting. 
2.     Security services (i.e. training, escorts, guards, or acting as a coast 
guard). 
3.     Crisis response, mainly hijackings negotiations. 
4.     Intervention to liberate hostages and vessels” (Struwe, 2012 p 259). 
As said above, some of these services such as the gathering of intelligence or the 
participation in negotiations can be seen as harmless, but some of the more military-
like practices do require for a deeper understanding on what problem may be involved 
in the use of PMSC.    
The main type of services provided by PMSC used for the investigation in this project 
is the on board security. These services usually consist of 3-10 on board security 
guards with military experience (Spearin, 2012) or the service of escort vessel tailing 
the merchant ship, and preventing acts of piracy (Struwe, 2012). 
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Complications using PMSC 
The PMSC operate dependent on what country, the ship they work on is registered in, 
a so-called “flag state” (Siebels, 2014). If a ship for instance is registered in Germany, 
its security guards have to be licensed by the German government. They have done 
this to secure a certain level of training and expertise among their guards and to 
regulate what weapons they can use (Siebels, 2014). Due to the nature of international 
shipping, the reality is that PMSC are faced with many legal overlaps. Private security 
companies have to oblige by the law of their companies’ country of origin, then the 
law of the flag under which the vessel is navigating, and when the vessel enters the 
national waters of a country, the laws of this country regarding PMSC also needs to 
be followed. This leaves PMSC working in a legal “grey area”, where their acts or 
even presence can be considered a criminal act in some jurisdictions and not in others 
(Siebels, 2014). Another problem of working in this legal “grey area” is the conduct 
of the security guards, which have been in doubt on occasions. But since November 
2010 the PMSC have to follow ICoC (the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Services Providers), but since the shipping industry is so international it is 
really difficult to regulate on the area (Siebels, 2014).  PMSC often carry small 
weapons, and they are only there to protect and work as a defense, furthermore PMSC 
are mostly used as a scare effect. Often it is just enough to be present in order to scare 
away pirates (The Economist, 2013). Struwe (2012) has theorized another problem 
with the use of PMSC, this is the increase of violence from the pirates as a reaction to 
the increasing of armed guards in the vessels. That is to say that if the pirates feel 
more threatened, they may respond by being more violent towards the ship instead of 
running away, which could increase the risk of the voyage and its members. Other 
problems that could happen would be that the lack of agreement in terms of payment 
leads to a contract disagreement between the PMSC and the shipping companies. This 
means that shipping companies in order to lessen their expenses, would hire less 
specialized or skilled security guards that would increase the risk of accidents or 
problems on the voyage (Siebels, 2014). Finally, another problem of PMSC is that 
being non-state actors, they cannot pursue or capture pirates, enter territorial waters in 
order to apprehend pirates or board suspicious vessels (Spearin, 2012). PMSC are 
unlike the naval forces not allowed to participate in any offensive actions, they are 
only allowed to use force as defense (Spearin, 2012). If they take part in a pursuit or 
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in any other way, PMSC are violating their right to self-defense, which may be seen 
as an act of piracy (UNCLOS, 1982 article 101 & 107). 
  
Analysis 
As explained above a number of different strategies were used on the ships in order to 
prevent them from being a suitable target for pirates. Using the VIVA aspect of the 
suitable target as explained in the theory, the consideration is that the value of the 
target has not varied, thus not affecting its suitability, but other aspects indeed have 
changed. If the crewmembers, in case of the bridge being compromised were able to 
sabotage the propulsion of the boat, then the inertia of the target would be zero, 
leaving the pirates no hope of moving the boat to a safe location. Even before the 
attack, the use of only navigating lights is an aspect that makes the visibility of the 
target more difficult. And finally, the inaccessibility to the ship has been improved, so 
that the pirates have problems accessing the ship with the use of barbed wire, water 
cannons and foam, thus making a suitable target a less suitable, having a causal 
relationship with the decrease in successful pirate attacks. In addition to the BMP4, 
since the introduction of PMSC and their means of operation on shipping vessels in 
Somalia, the number of approaches, successful attacks, and failed attacks have 
dramatically fallen, from August 2011 when PMSC became more accepted and 
recommended (Petrig, 2013). The usage of PMSC became more acceptable or even 
necessary in 2011. The number of attacks that year was in total 223, where 176 were 
failed attacks and 47 were incidents (IMO, 2011). The year after in 2012 the numbers 
shows a major reduction. The number was as following, the total number of incidents 
were 61, with 47 failed attacks and the number of incidents being only 14 (IMO, 
2012). The number of hijackings in this period is the lowest since 2007. And in 2013 
another decrease is observed, the total number of attack is 20, with 8 of them being 
incidents and 12 of them failed attempts (IMO, 2013).  
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Before the corporate intervention, the situation was as following. The offender was 
the Somali pirate, the target was the shipping vessels and the capable guardian should 
have been the naval force, but they could not stop the pirate attacks (Siebels, 2014). 
The situation after the shipping industry started using their own means of protection is 
as following: the offender and target is still the same, although the target now is much 
less suitable than it used to be. However PMSC’ addition to the naval forces as a 
capable guardian has shown to be successful. The larger number of capable guardians, 
which came with the addition of PMSC, increased the pirates risk of encountering a 
ship with a capable guardian, being either PMSC or naval forces, and the defensive 
nature of the corporate intervention combined with the more offensive nature of the 
military intervention. Taken the above into account, PMSC has been successful, not 
only in terms of decreasing the number of attacks, approaches, and failed attacks but 
also in terms of proving the routine activity theory useful. Again the routine activity 
theory is only a temporary crime prevention theory, so if the capable guardians were 
removed, and no onshore actions was done, the number of pirate attacks should 
increase again. This sudden decrease in the pirates’ success indicates that the 
corporate organization have had the needed success, at least in containing the 
problems and deterring the pirates.   
 
Chapter conclusion 
 As the international community became more and more involved in the fight against 
piracy in Somalia, it became clearer that something additional had to be done. The 
installment of the BMP4, where protective measures were used to protect ships, and 
the acceptance of the use of private security came in place, when the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), decided to change its views on having PMSC on board 
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on shipping vessels. The use of PMSC brought complications with it. First the legal 
issues had to be addressed; it proved to be difficulty in an international business as 
shipping. This leaves the PMSC to work in a legal “grey area”, since many laws from 
different countries overlap each other, with the question of whom has sovereignty at 
which times. In addition, having a defensive practice in nature, whilst being incapable 
of capturing and pursuing pirates have also proven problematic. Here is where the use 
of Naval forces proves to be necessary, since as explained in chapter 5, the 
apprehension of pirates can be left to the naval forces, while the defense of the ships 
are done by the corporate responses. To sum up the corporate responses in 
combination with the presence of naval military forces, caused pirate attacks to be 
contained and less successful in the number of hijackings.  
The lowering in all the numbers might suggest that other factors had also proven 
successful during this period. Some of the onshore actions have led to successes, 
which have lowered the incentive to commit piracy. These actions will be looked and 
reflected upon in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7. Onshore factors  
 
Introduction 
Although maritime strategies have been the most prominent method to counter piracy. 
Other means of countering piracy have been used as well. These measures, are land-
based and focused on stopping piracy, even resolving some of the problems that 
maritime intervention has shown in previous chapters. This chapter will first describe 
each of the other strategies pursued to counter piracy, and the problems there are with 
these strategies. Afterwards, an evaluation investigating if the concept presented in 
the expanded crime triangle can explain, how the onshore intervention factored in the 
reduction in piracy rates from a criminological perspective. 
 
Information sharing 
Another way to fight piracy is by sharing information beyond national borders and 
corporations. An example of this is the U.K. Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). 
They work with different organizations who then tell UKMTO, where their vessels 
are located/attacked or had spotted pirates (OBP, 2014b). This information is then 
passed along to UKMTOs other members like the naval forces or even the nearby 
ports (TradeArabia 2014). 
This way the different actors in the Gulf of Aden cooperates to fight piracy, by tracing 
the location of the ships to be able to react fast in case of an attack. 
In addition, another organization MSCHOA, as a part of EU NAVFOR, does the 
same work like UKMTO of sharing information with corporations and naval forces. 
The difference is in this case that in order to work with MSCHOA, the individual 
vessels need to register, so that MSCHOA can spread the information in case of an 
attack (MSCHOA, 2014). It is noticeable of the effect of MSCHOA that since 2009 to 
2011 the number of registrations with the organizations has increased from around 
1300 to more than 3300 registrations (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). The other naval 
forces also have their information sharing outlets, MARLO  (which shares 
information for CTF-151) and NATO shipping center, which is the information 
sharing office for NATO. In this case the fact that there are so many information 
sharing centers can be a problem of too much information being over reported (van 
Ginkel & Landman, 2012). 
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Capacity building 
One of the main problems with the maritime intervention done by naval forces were 
that after the apprehension of pirates or suspected pirates, there were no structures for 
offenders to be prosecuted on land, and therefore the vessels turned into the practice 
of “catch and release” (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). The attempt to solve that 
problem began with the Djibouti code of conduct (Dock) in 2009, which established a 
cooperation between the 21 regional countries that have signed the agreement, the 
Dcoc signatories agreed to cooperate in: 
(a) the investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons, who are reasonably 
suspected of having committed acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships, including those inciting or intentionally facilitating such acts 
(b) the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and property on board such 
ships. 
(c) the rescue of ships, persons and property subject to piracy and armed 
robbery and the facilitation of proper care, treatment and repatriation of 
seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers subject to 
such acts, particularly those who have been subjected to violence. 
(d) the conduct of shared operations, both among signatory States and with 
navies from countries outside the region such as nominating law enforcement 
or other authorized officials to embark on patrol ships or aircraft of another 
signatory. 
(Dcoc, 2009). 
In addition to these four resolutions for cooperation, the participant countries also 
agree to provide and share information by building information sharing centers in 
different regions like Kenya and Tanzania. The participants also agree to review their 
own law about piracy, which aims to provide with a better practice of investigations 
and prosecutions. The Dcoc also provided with another resolution asking for help to 
different international organizations to improve capacities and train forces in order to 
counter piracy (Dcoc, 2009). 
Following the problem of the lack of coordination between all the different 
interventions attempts, the contact group for piracy of the coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 
was established in 2009 in accordance to resolution 1851 (2008) and the Dcoc (2009) 
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calls for help. The CGPCS was created to coordinate and improve the counter piracy 
strategies taken by states and international organizations. (CGPCS,2009) 
The CGPCS consists of five different working groups, each of them focuses on five 
different focus areas to combat piracy. Coordination of all the different military 
interventions, capacity building in land, judicial problems with prosecuting pirates, 
improving self-defense tactics of maritime organizations, changing perceptions of 
piracy through the use of information outlets and the last one, which focuses on the 
apprehension of money flows and the big piracy investors (CGPCS,2011). 
 Also in line with the ask for help in the Dcoc and as a part of the EU comprehensive 
approach to counter piracy, a capacity building operation for the horn of Africa called 
EUCAP-Nestor had been mandated and became functional in July 2012. This 
operation’s goal is to create, enhance or improve the capacities of the different 
maritime security actors in Somalia, such as coast guard, navy, police, prosecutors, 
judges etc. (EUCAP Nestor, 2011). 
In particular this mission assist authorities in creating capacities and training 
operatives. In this case not only by establishing training courses for coast guard, but 
also by training prosecutors and supporting the creation of new laws against piracy in 
the region. (EUCAP Nestor, 2011). 
All in all different initiatives have been taken in order for Somalia to have better 
capacities to counter piracy. 
 Some private organizations are also trying to improve the situation in Somalia, such 
as Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). They are trying to persuade the locals to stay on 
land, by using the clan elders and religious leaders to spread their message. All with 
relative success, since some villages have declared themselves a “no-pirate-zone” 
(Bueger, 2012). Rehabilitation also plays a vital role, which NCA’s campaign “don’t 
return to piracy” is about. It tries to give people hope for a better future by providing 
former pirates training, so they can live an alternative life away from piracy (Bueger, 
2012). 
 
Problems with the different onshore factors. 
As with maritime factors, problems have surged with the onshore factors as well. The 
main problem with the Dcoc and the information sharing centers, are mainly that 
although they are located on shore and build capacities, they still only focus on the 
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characteristics of piracy without addressing the causes for piracy or the motivations of 
the pirates (van Ginkel & Landman, 2012). And yet other capacity building measures 
have problems, because of the hostility some of the Somali population have shown 
towards foreigners and the level of violence in the country, is required additional 
protection. These measures are also under funded as shown in the ‘Costs of Piracy 
report’ from 2012, all capacity building measures researched in the report accounted 
for approximately 24 million dollars, while the estimated total costs of piracy was 
between 5.7 and 6.1 billion dollars (Bellish, 2013). 
 
 Situation from 2012 forward in Somalia 
Since 2012, piracy has decreased substantially furthermore compared to 2011. In total 
the number of pirate actions reported in 2012 was 61, 14 of them were incidents and 
47 of them failed attempts (IMO, 2012). The total number of piracy reports in 2013 is 
20, where 8 of them are incidents and 12 of them failed attempts (IMO, 2013). 
Leading to the realization that piracy attacks have not only been less successful in 
hijacking ships, but have also decreased in quantity. 
This was the situation at sea, but the situation in land was also changing at the same 
time. In 2012, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), who was the recognized 
government since 2004, although it lacked control of the country and legitimacy with 
the population. Even until 2010, the TFG had very little control (Hesse, 2011 pp 1). 
After two more years and with the help of AMISOM (African Union Mission in 
Somalia), the power and control of the federal government extended. In 2012, the 
transitional government became the Federal Government of Somalia. The newly 
elected government appears to be more stable, although conflict in Somalia is still 
ongoing, at the moment with the AMISOM peacekeepers stabilizing the area (BBC 
news, 2014). This stabilization has led to the creation of the Somali EEZ as stipulated 
by the UN law of the sea (UNCLOS article. 55 p 40). The formal creation of the 
Somali EEZ for the first time implies that there could be a reduction in the illegal 
fishing (OBP, 2014a) since companies doing the illegal fishing will now be eligible 
for prosecution. This could be a determinant factor in order to provide a definite 
solution to piracy by fixing the grievances of the people committing piracy. 
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Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, piracy can only be removed, if actions onshore are made to 
better the living conditions for the people of Somalia, and offer them an alternative to 
piracy. In the Crime Triangle, some of the onshore actions could be described as 
“handlers”. The handler would be seen as any actor who can prevent the offender’s 
motivation for a given crime, by decreasing the opportunity for the offender to act, or 
by having a moral tie to the offender (Felson & Santos, 2009 pp 25-33). In this case 
the handlers could be the clan elders or religious leaders such as an imam. That is why 
the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is focused on getting the handlers engaged in the 
struggle to keep men away from piracy (Bueger, 2012). Since the clan elders are the 
ones that hold the power and controls the clans, they are extremely important to the 
NCA and the international community. Without the elders, it is hard to remove the 
root to piracy, which is the onshore environment that produces the pirates. NCA is 
also helping the handlers by building a better environment in Somalia. They are doing 
this by providing training to former pirates, so they can get a job and have a legal 
income in order to offer them an alternative life away from piracy (Bueger, 2012). 
The second initiative in order to prevent crime, according to the Crime Triangle, is the 
“manager”, this could be a place manager and is the one that has the control, when a 
pirate attack occur (Felson & Santos, 25-33 2009). This could also be the government 
of Somalia, whom with the help of AMISOM and other organizations gained more 
power and is now more able to practice a better governance. The onshore measures 
also try to establish “place managers”, by training the official coast guard of Somalia. 
Since the place is the ocean, the managers would be the coast guard and controllers in 
ports. Although problems have been noticed with these measures the installment in 
some level of managers and handlers are visible. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
When the maritime part of the fight against piracy started to get results, more focus 
was put on inland Somalia and how to remove the pirates, so that the threat could not 
only be contained but also stopped. With The Djibouti code of conduct, 21 regional 
countries’ agreed to share gathered information about pirates, so they could get caught 
and prosecuted. Various groups and organizations have taken part in rebuilding 
Somalia, such as the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). They are focusing on providing 
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a life away from piracy and try to implement this idea to the community. Some 
focuses on sharing information, such as MSCHOA & UKMTO. Others like The 
Contact Group for Piracy of the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) has helped with judicial 
problems with prosecuting pirates, improving self-defense tactics, and the 
apprehension of money flows from the piracy investors. All of these actions have 
been taken in order to improve handlers and managers role in preventing crime. It is 
an acknowledge hypotheses in piracy studies that, addressing problems onshore is the 
permanent way of preventing piracy (Bueger 2012).  
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Chapter. 8 Conclusion  
 
The aim of the project was to answer the research question: “Which factors of 
countering piracy accounts for the decrease in piracy with roots in Somalia from 
2007-2013?“. In addition, theories from criminology have been used in order to 
evaluate the different intervention types, and understand how the different counter 
piracy factors contributed to the decrease in piracy with roots in Somalia. Worral 
(2000) used the routine activity theory to explain the general situation in which acts of 
piracy occurs, in the period before international intervention, the situation in which 
the crime occur was the Somali waters. The motivated offender was the former 
Somali coastal population, now collecting what they refer to as “taxes” on the suitable 
target in this case the commercial vessels passing through the area. The capable 
guardian was at this time not present, since the failed state of Somalia did not have the 
means to protect their waters and keep pirates out of their docks. All these factors 
made the idea of committing piracy appear rational to the pirates. The last condition is 
that the pirates and the commercial vessels come together in time and space. 
The end of 2008 naval forces initiated several operations ordered by various 
international actors.  
Now the naval were in place, but did not fully contain the situation, because of 
incapability in relation to legislations and the increase in area, which the naval forces 
had to protect. There were no reduction in the number of pirate attacks, and in fact 
there was an increase. The naval forces should have functioned as a scare tactic 
deterring pirates from attempting attacks. In relations to the routine activity theory, if 
the naval forces had been successful as a guardian, they should have raised the stakes 
of getting caught to such a degree that the cost now outweighed the benefits, and by 
doing so make the act of piracy appear less appealing. The effect they showed was by 
lowering the success rate of the pirate attacks (the number of attacks rose, while the 
number of successful hijackings lowered). That meant the naval forces were 
insufficient, but did have some effect of preventing single cases of pirate attacks. 
This project shows that the naval forces and the PMSC combined should be viewed as 
a capable guardian. After the use of PMSC rose to an estimated number of 60% (The 
Economist, 2013), more ships were capable of self defense at the time of the attack. It 
did not cause a change in the size of the afflicted area, but the amount of ships 
needing protection decreased. These factors made the ships complicated to access and 
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able to self-defense for the pirates in relations to the probability of a successful attack. 
From a rational choice perspective this can be understood, where the value of the ship 
stays the same, but has a major increase in the risk aspect and “scared” the pirates 
from committing acts of piracy.  
In the routine activity theory the suitable target is presented as a factor. It then 
presents the grounds of how the suitable target is defined, and how it should be 
altered in accordance to make the target appear less suitable. These conditions are 
presented as VIVA. The BMP4 (2011) is a guide to handle or avoid hostile situations. 
The measures mentioned by the BMP4 relates with VIVA at certain points. Value and 
visibility is difficult for the ship to accommodate for, few simple measures can limit 
the targets visibility. Furthermore, the value of the ships are not easy to alter, the ships 
value only varies with its age and the cargos value might change, but the value is 
generally high. The BMP4 guidance to protect ships affects the Inertia and  Access 
aspects of VIVA (Cohen & Felson, 1979). BMP4 gives solutions on how to avoid 
losing the ship, by for instance blocking the propulsion of the ship to refrain its 
mobility. It also suggests different ways to make the accessibility more difficult, and 
therefore more troublesome to board.  
According to Christian Bueger (2012) the only way to resolve the problem of piracy 
is by improving the environment in Somalia, which piracy thrives in, this being the 
situation of a failed state. If we look at the root causes stated by Murphy (2010 cited 
in Samatar et. al. 2010) It is four criteria for piracy to emerge in a region. Two of 
those criteria relates to the failed state of Somalia. Because of the disputes that 
resulted in the fall of the communist regime in 1991, there was no functioning 
Government in Somalia. That is why there is a lot of ungoverned areas in Somalia and 
a lack of proper law enforcement and political will in others, therefore the 
international community should shift their attention to reinforce governance and build 
capacities in Somalia. Bueger (2012), who also argues that there has been a lack of 
attention on onshore actions (by 2012) compared to the short term maritime methods. 
He further states that the people of Somalia need a better alternative to piracy. 
Although there has been more attention in later years, onshore actions have much less 
weight than maritime actions. The theory that explains how these onshore factors give 
a long-term solution to piracy, is the expanded crime triangle. The concepts it presents 
are the, “handlers” and “managers” they are needed in order to prevent a crime. The 
handlers in Somalia could be the clan elders or religious leaders such as an imam. The 
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elders can help by prohibit any pirate activity, and by making their area a “pirate free-
zone”. The elders hold the power in the clans, so their word is law due to the clan 
driven nature of Somalia. The Imams are the religious leaders, who by condemning 
the act of piracy, should be able to scare people from committing the crime. The 
second initiative in order to prevent crime, according to the Crime Triangle, is the 
“manager”. The manager, in this case is the government of Somalia, and by definition 
the coast guard of Somalia, since they are the ones controlling the ports and the 
Somali waters. The coast guards ability to do so have increased with the installment 
of the EEZ in 2014 (OBP, 2014a), and with the training of an official coast guard of 
Somalia that has been trained from different organizations (EUCAP Nestor, 2011). It 
is also noticeable to say that the stabilization of the conflict in Somalia can also mean 
that the offenders are no longer motivated, since the possibilities of making a living 
legally has increased. All in all, the factors that accounted for the decrease of piracy, 
were the cooperation between naval forces and private endeavors, but in order for this 
cooperation to work effectively some capacity building needed to be implemented, in 
addition the focus on the stabilization of Somalia has also a spillover effect in Piracy, 
as the offenders have less motivations to commit the crime.  
 
Perspectivation 
The case of piracy in Somalia, worked well in relation with the theories, showing how 
the concepts established in the crime triangle are sufficient to explain the decrease in 
piracy, and to show that pirates act rationally. The situation in Somalia has changed 
since the first intervention by the international community. The shipping vessels are 
no longer being attacked in the same numbers as before. The factors that account for 
the decrease of piracy in Somalia, were the cooperation between the naval forces and 
the corporate actors, this could be seen as the way forward in regards to the fight 
against piracy in other regions. When the threat has been contained, they should try to 
resolve the specific root causes on land of each country as a sustainable solution, as it 
is being attempted in Somalia now. Although the special situation of Somalia, allows 
the international community to have more control over the country. It could be 
possible to fight piracy better in other regions of the world, if the countries in those 
regions allow for more cooperation and involvement of the international community, 
even though they would have to surrender a part of their sovereignty.  
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The mission to contain the pirates have been a relative success, this has been possible, 
because of the different means of interventions, which implies large sums of money 
invested by the international community. One could argue that these results are not 
sustainable, since they only prevent attacks and do not deal with the onshore problems 
that cause the piracy. This means that as soon as the international community 
withdraws their forces or the notion of piracy as a threat lowers, piracy could return to 
numbers seen in the period around 2011. 
As mentioned above in the project, Bueger (2012) stated that too little attention had 
been paid to onshore preventive factors, but that has been slowly shifting. Nowadays 
forces from the African Union are regaining control in some of the Somali regions by 
fighting Al Shabaab. The presence of the African Union helps stabilizing Somalia, the 
setting for an improved and more stable Somalia has apparently been set. It is hard to 
predict the future of Somalia, because the country has gone through a high amount of 
conflicts in the last decades.  
This shows the complexity of dealing with maritime piracy. As stated earlier the 
offshore interventions, could be used as a temporary solution, which can be 
implemented relatively fast. Whereas, the onshore solutions is known to scholars 
(Bueger 2012; Samatar et. al. 2010 Hastings 2009; van Ginkel & Landman, 2012) as a 
more comprehensive way of combatting piracy and eradicate the problem 
permanently, by changing the root causes that must be present for piracy to exist.  
The offshore solution is still present and will be until 2016, until then it is difficult to 
assess whether or not the root causes of Somali piracy have completely been dealt 
with or not.    
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